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“SIMPLIFY YOU, CLASSIFY YOU”: STIGMA, 
STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 
Michael L. Perlin∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Before becoming a professor, I spent thirteen years as a 
practitioner, mostly representing criminal defendants with mental 
disabilities and persons subjected to involuntary civil commitment or 
committed to psychiatric hospitals. I have taught mental disability 
law for twenty-five years, and in the past eighteen of those years, my 
research and scholarship has focused mostly on what I call “sanism”1 
and on what I call “pretextuality,”2 shorthand for the ways that 
prejudice towards persons with mental disabilities leads to stigma and 
stereotyping, and the ways that these factors malignantly distort both 
the legislative and judicial processes.3 I believe that these factors are 
constant whether the topic is commitment, the right to refuse 
treatment, sexual autonomy, deinstitutionalization, any aspect of the 
criminal trial process, from the determination of competency to stand 
trial to the ultimate death penalty decision, or the relationship 
between international human rights law and mental disability law.4 In 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗  Professor of Law, New York Law School. Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform 
Project. Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program. The author wishes to thank Jackie Halpern 
and Lisa Ruff for their excellent research assistance, and Laura Rothstein, Mark Weber, and Theresa 
Glennon for their helpful advice. A much earlier version of this paper was presented at the Third Anglo-
American Symposium on Special Education & School Reform at Cambridge University, England, June 
10, 2004. 
 1. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992). 
 2. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993). 
 3. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, ‘Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth’: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and 
How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 3 (1999). 
 4. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); Michael 
L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould, & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 80 (1995); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions 
and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in 
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this paper I consider the question of the extent to which these factors 
and these principles do or do not equally contaminate the special 
education process, and the decision to label certain children as 
learning disabled.5 I begin with my ultimate thesis: The process of 
labeling children with intellectual disabilities is not merely a double-
edged sword; it is at least a triple-edged and perhaps a quadruple-
edged (or quintuple-edged) one. It is essential that policy makers 
acknowledge this in any recalibration of statutory standards or 
educational policy “reforms” that are undertaken. If we ignore these 
conflicting issues, barriers, and dilemmas, we run the risk of re-
creating a system that unnecessarily stigmatizes and fails to provide 
adequate services to those who need them. 
In coming to these conclusions, I have identified five conflicts and 
clusters of policy issues that we must consider: 
                                                                                                                 
Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114 (1996); Michael L. 
Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517 (1993–1994); Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is 
Good, You’ll Find out When You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
235 (2001–2002); Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2002-2003); Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My 
Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse 
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005); Perlin, supra note 2; Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist 
Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 
8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 239 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is 
Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 201 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability 
Law: The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69 
(2006); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability Law: 
The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333 (2006–2007). 
 5. I am no stranger to this area of the law. During my years as a mental health advocacy lawyer, I 
also spent two years as Acting Director of the Advocacy for the Developmentally Disabled Project 
Office of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, and special education cases were among 
the core caseload of that office. When I was Special Counsel to the Commissioner of the Public 
Advocate Department, I filed a brief with the United States Supreme Court in Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro, which held that the provision of clean intermittent catheterization was a “related 
service” to which the plaintiff was entitled under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act 
(EHA). 468 U.S. 883, 895 (1984). Finally, in my first years of full-time teaching, I directed New York 
Law School’s Federal Litigation Clinic. In that position, I supervised students who represented children 
with disabilities at special education hearings before New York State administrative law judges. 
2
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• The need to ensure that all children receive adequate 
education; 
• The need to ensure that the “cure” is not worse than the 
“illness”; that is, that the labeling of a child as being in 
need of special education services does not ensure that the 
child will forever be seen as a second-class citizen;  
• The need to consider the ultimate impact this decision may 
have if the child eventually winds up in the criminal justice 
system; 
• The need to consider the relationship between the decision-
making in this system and issues of gender, social class, 
and race; and 
• The need to consider the public’s attitude that a learning 
disability label is an advantage to a child competing for 
admission to a prestigious university or graduate school. 
I believe that it is essential to consider each of these—both 
separately and in context with each other—if we are to make some 
sense of the underlying problems and issues. 
My paper will proceed in the following manner. In Part I, I will 
briefly trace the history of American federal legislation and special 
education law reform in the American courts. In Part II, I will 
consider some of the “real life” problems that create pitfalls in the 
implementation and enforcement of those laws. In Part III, I will look 
at the meanings of “sanism” and “pretextuality” in an effort to 
illuminate the insidious ways that stereotyping drives decision-
making. In Part IV, I will consider issues of race and social class, 
looking specifically at the connection between these issues, sanism 
and pretextuality, and the implications of that connection for the 
purposes of this inquiry. In Part V, I will consider the unique 
relationship between special education labeling and the criminal 
justice system, paying particular attention to the important 
implications of the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in 
3
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Atkins v. Virginia,6 which bars the execution of persons with mental 
retardation. In Part VI, I will look at the way that special education 
labeling is seen as somehow different from other types of labeling, 
noting that some upper-middle class and upper class families 
sometimes view the label as a strategic or tactical advantage. Finally, 
I will conclude with some modest recommendations. 
My title comes from Bob Dylan’s classic (though never heard 
today) masterpiece, All I Really Want to Do.7 In it, Dylan pours out a 
litany of what he does not want to do to the object of his affections, 
opening with this verse: 
I ain’t lookin’ to compete with you, 
Beat or cheat or mistreat you,  
Simplify you, classify you,  
Deny, defy or crucify you.  
All I really want to do  
Is, baby, be friends with you.8 
I expect that what we have done, and what we continue to do to 
learning disabled children, is precisely what Dylan promised not to 
do: “Simplify you, classify you.”9 Writing about this topic, Professor 
Peter David Blanck has said: “Over the course of the twenty-first 
century, our challenge is to strive toward national policies that 
promote inclusion of all persons, with and without disabilities, based 
on values of individual worth, fairness, and justice.”10 I write this 
paper to make us think a bit about the past errors of our ways and 
seek to bring us incrementally closer to Professor Blanck’s vision and 
aspirations. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 7. BOB DYLAN, All I Really Want to Do, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 
1964). Dylan last sang the song live on December 3, 1978. Adam Selzer, How Long Has It Been Since 
Dylan Played?, http://bobdylan.com/links/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
 8. DYLAN, supra note 7. 
 9. On the necessity of classification so that schools can fulfill federal mandates, see Patrick 
Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: Equal Protection, Title VII and Justifying the Use of Race in 
the Hiring of Special Educators, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 179, 188 (2001). 
 10. Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 217 (2001). 
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I. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY11 
Two federal cases set the stage for the first important federal 
education legislation on behalf of children with disabilities: 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. 
Pennsylvania, a consent decree stating that the denial of educational 
services to children with mental retardation violated the Equal 
Protection Clause,12 and Mills v. Board of Education, holding that the 
exclusion of children with disabilities from public school programs 
violated the Due Process Clause.13 These two cases were frequently 
cited by Congress as sources of inspiration for subsequent 
ameliorative legislation.14 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no 
general federal constitutional right to education.15 In so declaring, the 
Court, per Justice Powell, concluded that while a proper education is 
a laudable policy goal, it does not rise to constitutional dimensions.16 
This decision further led advocates to turn to legislation as the 
appropriate remedy for inadequate education. 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
(EAHCA)17 — the predecessor to the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA)18 — was an “ambitious congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 11. This section is partially adapted from 5 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL § 13C-1, at 26-27 (2d ed. 2002). 
 12. 334 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 13. 348 F.Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 14. Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barriers to the Education of Students with 
Emotional Disabilities, 60 TENN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1993). 
 15. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 16. Id. at 36. But see id. at 37 (“[N]o charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide 
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”) (emphasis added). 
 17. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482). 
 18. Id. For a helpful review, see Stanley S. Herr, Reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 35 MENTAL RETARDATION 131 (April 1997). Despite EHA’s name change to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1990, the basic principles of EHA are embodied 
in IDEA. See, e.g., Rebecca Weber Goldman, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive 
Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 243 (1994–1995). 
5
Perlin: "Simplify You, Classify You": Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Right
Published by Reading Room, 2009
612 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
 
 
attempt”19 designed to ensure that all handicapped children have 
available a free public education appropriately designed to meet their 
unique and individual needs.20 As a remedial statute, it was written to 
be applied broadly and construed liberally in favor of the provision of 
such education to handicapped students.21 To be eligible for funds 
under the Act, each state was required to establish procedures to 
ensure that, “To the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped 
children, including children in public or private institutions or other 
care facilities, are educated with children who are not 
handicapped.”22 
To ensure the provision of such education, the implementing 
regulations specified that each state educational agency “shall make 
arrangements with public or private institutions (such as a 
memorandum of agreement or special implementation procedures) as 
may be necessary to insure that [this section] is effectively 
implemented.”23 The comment to this regulation underscored the 
point: “Regardless for other reasons for institutional placement, no 
child in an institution who is capable of education in a regular public 
school setting may be denied access to an education in that setting.”24 
IDEA, the successor act, was designed to assure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free and appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Rabinowitz v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481, 485 (D.N.J. 1982). 
 20. See, e.g., Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1335 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 21. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex. 1981); see also S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 
342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 22. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat. 773, 
781 (codified as amended 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006)) (emphasis added); see also id. § 614, 89 
Stat. 784 (providing that an educational agency’s funding application must include goal of enabling, to 
the maximum extent practicable, handicapped children residing in institutions to participate in regular 
education programs). For a helpful overview, see Judith Welch Wegner, Educational Rights of 
Handicapped Children: Three Federal Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence, Part I: The Statutory 
Maze, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 387 (1988); see also id. at 387 n.2 (listing then-recent pertinent scholarship); 
Glennon, supra note 14; Omyra M. Ramsingh, Disciplining Children Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 155 (1995–1996); Daniel H. Melvin, 
The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (1994-1995); Stephanie L. 
Gill, Punitive Damages: Flying in the Face of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?, 100 
DICK. L. REV. 383 (1995–1996). 
 23. 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 (1984). 
 24. Comment to 34 C.F.R. § 300.554 (1984). 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/6
2009] DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS  
 
 
613
 
designed to meet their unique needs.25 It defines “special education” 
as “specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs of a 
child with a disability.”26 To create a free and appropriate public 
education program for each disabled child, the IDEA requires a 
multidisciplinary team, which includes the child’s parents, to develop 
an Individualized Education Program (IEP).27 It states a clear 
preference for educating children in the “least restrictive 
environment,”28 and in a setting with their peers who do not have 
disabilities whenever possible.29 Such children should be removed 
from the regular classroom environment only when education in the 
classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily with the use of 
supplementary aides and services.30 The least restrictive environment 
principle also requires that children be kept in the same public school 
they would attend if not disabled, and as close as possible to their 
homes, rather than in separate schools for disabled children.31 
The Supreme Court subsequently explained why Congress enacted 
prophylactic legislation: 
When the law was passed in 1975, Congress had before it ample 
evidence that such legislative assurances were sorely needed: 21 
years after this Court declared education to be “perhaps the most 
                                                                                                                 
 25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); see generally Ronald Wenkart, The Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act and the Establishment Clause of The United States Constitution, 23 
WHITTIER L. REV. 411 (2001-2002). Under the IDEA, a “child with a disability” is eligible for 
assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A), (B) (2000). The disability can be “mental retardation, hearing 
impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance, 
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning 
disabilities.” Id. In additional to the disability and because of it, the child must require special education 
and related services. Id. For children between the ages of three and nine “disability” can include 
developmental delays. Id. 
 26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
 27. 34 C.F.R. § 300.340-.349 (1992). The IEP should set forth the child’s present educational 
performance, detail annual goals and short term objectives for improvement in that performance, and 
describe the special instruction and related services that will enable the child to meet those objectives. 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2005); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1992). 
 28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2005). On the mental disability law sources of the 
“least restrictive alternative” doctrine, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 11, § 2C-5.3 to 5.3e, at 417–34. 
 29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (2005).  
 30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1992). 
 31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (1992). 
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important function of state and local governments,” Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 
L.Ed. 873 (1954), congressional studies revealed that better than 
half of the Nation’s 8 million disabled children were not 
receiving appropriate educational services. § 1400(b)(3). Indeed, 
one out of every eight of these children was excluded from the 
public school system altogether, § 1400(b)(4); many others were 
simply “warehoused” in special classes or were neglectfully 
shepherded through the system until they were old enough to 
drop out. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975). Among the most 
poorly served of disabled students were emotionally disturbed 
children: Congressional statistics revealed that for the school 
year immediately preceding passage of the Act, the educational 
needs of 82 percent of all children with emotional disabilities 
went unmet.32  
The IDEA—born in an effort to combat stigma33—focused on 
individualized treatment and mainstreaming as its core 
characteristics.34 The question that must be next considered is what 
pitfalls have stood in the way of full enforcement of the Act, and the 
implications of these pitfalls for policy in this area of the law. 
II. PITFALLS AND PROBLEMS 
I have identified five pitfalls that we must consider in our attempts 
to understand the underlying issues: 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988). 
 33. Peter Blanck, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 85 IOWA L. 
REV. 1811, 1814 (1999–2000). 
 34. The Ninth Circuit, by way of example, has held that an administrative law judge properly found 
that the mainstreaming requirement under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400–1482, contains a legal 
presumption in favor of placing students with disabilities in regular classes with students who are similar 
in age. See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 
1994). That presumption can be rebutted, however, by a showing that the student’s educational needs 
require removal from the regular classroom. Id. 
8
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• The problem of insufficient funding; 
• The reality that local programs often prove disastrous 
where children with intellectual disabilities are mingled 
with children with serious behavioral problems; 
• The reality that children may still be isolated within 
mainstreamed classes; 
• The fact that mainstreaming may help parents deny the 
reality that their child does have a disability and is need of 
special services; and 
• The possibility that mainstreaming may lead to the creation 
of new stereotypes. 
I will address each of these briefly.  
First, there is no question that special education has been woefully 
under-funded, and that there are no signs that this situation is 
improving.35 One Congressman put it succinctly and accurately: 
“[I]nsufficient funding for special education compromises the 
education of every student.”36 Although courts have sought to remedy 
these problems in individual cases,37 the problem is clearly systemic, 
and shows no signs of diminishing. 
What is so sadly ironic here is this: the issue of lack of funding 
pre-dates the creation of special education law and continues to 
dominate much policy discussion after more than three decades of 
congressional action. In Mills v. Board of Education, the court found 
that “the school system regularly excluded certain handicapped 
children, using the justification that the school lacked funds to 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, NCLB: What Does it Mean for Students with Disabilities?, 185 
ED. LAW REP. 805 (2004); Andriy Krahmal, Perry A. Zirkel & Emily J. Kirk, “Additional Evidence” 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Need for Rigor, 9 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 
201, 221 (2003–2004). 
 36. Terry Jean Seligmann, An Idea Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education Legislation, 
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 783 n.128 (2001–2002) (quoting Congressman Michael Ferguson). 
 37. See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep’t. of Educ. of Connecticut, No. CV 980492696, 1999 
WL 74531 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1999) (affirming one year of compensatory education services to a 
juvenile with mild mental retardation where school district had insufficient staff, funding, and resources 
to provide adequate special education services). 
9
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provide proper evaluation, personnel, and service,”38 and ruled that 
because inadequacies of school funding could not “be permitted to 
bear more heavily on the ‘exceptional’ or handicapped child than on 
the normal child,”39 each child of school age was thus entitled to “a 
free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the 
degree of the child’s mental, physical or emotional disability or 
impairment.”40 And today, budget problems continue to plague 
school districts. As one commentator has noted, “Because of the 
increasing number of special education children served in mainstream 
settings, experts find that it is no longer possible for the states to 
accurately divide expenditures between general and special 
education.”41 
Second, the problems faced in special education classes by 
students with emotional disabilities are enormous. According to 
Professor Theresa Glennon: 
There can be little doubt that schools are failing their mission to 
serve this nation’s emotionally disturbed children. Only a tiny 
percentage of students identified as seriously emotionally 
disturbed perform at or above grade level, and the evidence 
shows that they fall farther behind each year they attend school. 
These students also drop out of school at an alarming rate, much 
higher than for any other exceptionality. Very few students who 
are identified under the definition of seriously emotionally 
disturbed improve enough to be decertified. The post-school 
careers of these students are equally distressing: approximately 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Philip W. Clements, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley: The Supreme Court Takes a Conservative 
Approach to the Education of Handicapped Children, 61 N.C. L. REV. 881, 883 (1982–1983) 
(discussing Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)). 
 39. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876. 
 40. Id. at 878. 
 41. Seligmann, supra note 36, at 783–84. See also, e.g., Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 
v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 262 (Mont. 2005) (on the relationship between budgeted costs for special 
education and “quality education”). On the funding incentives for school districts to over-identify 
students as learning disabled, see Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 447–48 (2004), and see also Theresa 
M. Willard, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Influence of Funding 
Formulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled Students, 31 IND. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (1998). 
10
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one-third are unemployed, and almost one-half of the youth out 
of school for two years have arrest records.42 
There have been few studies on the impacts of “co-mingling” 
children with different disabilities. Statistics show that for the cases 
identifiable in terms of the child’s disability, these classifications 
were the most frequent: learning disability (27.4%), physical 
impairment (22.3%), emotional disturbance (13.8%), and mental 
retardation (20.1%).43 This issue is inextricably interlinked with the 
politics of special education labeling. Among the reasons suggested 
for the increase in the number of children categorized as having 
learning disabilities is that this category is often viewed by parents 
(and, perhaps, by school administrators) as less stigmatizing than 
more antiquated labels like mild, or educable mental retardation,44 a 
categorization known in some circles as the results of “classification 
plea bargaining.”45 In short, this is a very culturally, socially, and 
politically complex issue.46 
Third, a debate continues to rage as to the amount of time students 
with learning disabilities should spend in mainstreamed classrooms 
as opposed to separate classrooms.47 While the IDEA mandates that 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Glennon, supra note 14, at 305–06. 
 43. Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law: An Empirical Trends 
Analysis, 161 ED. LAW REP. 731, 734 (2002). 
 44. Seligmann, supra note 36, at 770. 
 45. Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: Toward a Quality System 
for All Students, 57 HARV. EDUC. REV. 367, 373 (1987). 
 46. It must be stressed that many students with learning disabilities who receive appropriate 
accommodations are successful in academic programs. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Disabilities to 
Exceptional Abilities: Law Students with Disabilities, Nontraditional Learners, and the Law Teacher as 
a Learner, 6 NEV. L.J. 116, 122 (2005–2006) (“With advances in knowledge about education, including 
knowledge about different learning styles, appropriate accommodations, strategies, and compensations 
for both students with physical and learning disabilities, many students are matriculating through 
undergraduate programs with a high degree of success.”). 
 47. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional 
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1236 
n.165 (2003):  
Indeed, a longstanding debate in special education circles concerns the question of the 
relative amount of time disabled students should spend in mainstream as opposed to 
separate classrooms. Special education experts cast the debate in terms of “inclusion” 
versus “placement diversity.” Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Educational 
Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 
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children with learning disabilities be educated, wherever possible, in 
a regular classroom, they may be educated outside of such 
classrooms if mainstreaming would not provide a satisfactory 
education program.48 Also, courts have held that academic 
achievement is not the only reason for mainstreaming: 
[O]ur inquiry must extend beyond the educational benefits that 
the child may receive in regular education. We also must 
examine the child’s overall educational experience in the 
mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular and 
special education for each individual child.49  
The overwhelming majority of evidence, by way of example, 
suggests that “language and role modeling from association with non-
disabled peers are essential benefits of mainstreaming.”50 
Yet there is still a smattering of case law that points out that there 
may be negative side-effects of mainstreaming: that the child may 
suffer interpersonally if she falls significantly behind her peers who 
are not disabled,51 and that there may be services simply unavailable 
in a mainstreamed setting.52 These are issues that cannot be ignored 
in this investigation. 
                                                                                                                 
523, 536–45 (1996) (classifying proponents of inclusion as those who favor moving 
existing special education services into mainstream settings, and supporters of placement 
diversity as those who prefer to leave the question of placement up to the educators’ 
individual assessments). In the context of this debate, placing responsibility for the actual 
provision of educational services in one set of hands makes sense as an implementation 
matter, particularly where optimizing the mix of mainstream and separate instruction for 
disabled students involves shuttling students between mainstream and specialized 
classroom settings. 
 48. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2005).  
 49. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Ed., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989). The Daniel R.R. case is 
discussed in this context in Michael Hazelkorn, Reasonable v. Reasonableness: The Littlegeorge 
Standard, 182 ED. LAW REP. 655, 661–62 (2004). 
 50. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993). But see W. N. Bender, The Case 
Against Mainstreaming: Empirical Support for the Political Backlash, 105 EDUC. 279 (1985) (arguing 
the contrary view that mainstreaming of children with disabilities compromises the education of other 
children, and discussing negative attitudes expressed by teachers and peers). 
 51. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 52. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 464 U.S. 864 (1983). 
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Fourth, the issue of denial of reality is a difficult one, and is 
probably beyond the law’s reach, but there are some examples in the 
legal literature that should force us to consider the potential impact of 
this issue. One article quotes a letter from the parents of a child with 
a learning disability to a New York state senator:  
We admit that when she was around 4 years old that our goal 
was to somehow get her mainstreamed—we thought it was best 
for her, but actually as we ponder[ed] that thought—it was to 
fulfill a need of ours—because if she was in a regular school 
setting we would feel we did our part as parents giving her the 
‘normalcy’ that she deserved.53 
Another quotes a parent describing her daughter, “I was not willing 
to accept the slow theory.”54 There is no evidence that these are 
universal attitudes, but they, again, are ones that must be factored into 
any analysis of the overarching issues that are at the core of this 
paper. 
Fifth, we need to consider the difficult question of whether new 
stereotypes may be created, and if that happens, the relevance of that 
phenomenon. It is black-letter law that “[p]rivate biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, 
give them effect.”55 This, however, does not conclude the inquiry. 
One commentator questioned, by way of example, how clients will 
respond to lawyers that they believe were able to pass the bar only 
because of special accommodations.56 For example, the “extra-time 
on the bar” attorney may be stereotyped as needing more time to 
work on a case than a “regular time” attorney, and a client may 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Therese Craparo, Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 522 (2002–2003) (emphasis added). 
 54. W. Ray Williams, Hand-up or Handout? The Americans with Disabilities Act and 
“Unreasonable Accommodation” of Learning Disabled Bar Applicants: Toward a New Paradigm, 34 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 633 (2001–2002). 
 55. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 100–05. It may belabor the obvious to ask whether similar 
questions as to the abilities of female or African-American attorneys would be taken even remotely 
seriously.  
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question the number of billable hours.57 Also, managers who consider 
hiring workers with disabilities express concerns that “the disabled 
worker’s personal needs will affect job performance.”58  
Again, these attitudes cannot—and must not—stand in the way of 
civil rights legislation on behalf of persons with disabilities. But 
when we think about stigma and stereotypes, it would be short-
sighted for us to Aput our heads in the sand@ and make believe that 
these attitudes do not exist. 
III.  SANISM AND PRETEXTUALITY 
As I already indicated, I believe that it is impossible to understand 
anything about the way we construct persons with disabilities in the 
community, the classroom, and the courtroom without understanding 
the deep textures of sanism and or pretextuality.59  
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character 
as other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.60 
It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all 
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders, 
counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.61 Its corrosive effects have 
warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil 
commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Williams, supra note 54, at 659. 
 58. Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 47 (1997). 
 59. See generally Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4. 
 60. See generally PERLIN, supra note 3. The classic study is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF 
PREJUDICE (1955). But see ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES (1996) 
(questioning Allport’s conclusions). The word “sanism” was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by 
Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its 
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 105 (Frank Ayd ed., 1974) 
[hereinafter Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments]; see also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 
n.12 (2d Cir. 1978). Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as having first developed and articulated the 
constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for institutionalized mental patients. See Morton 
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 11, § 3A-
2.1, at 8–12 (2d ed. 1999). 
 61. On the way that sanism affects lawyers’ representation of clients, see PERLIN, supra note 3, at 
28, 55–56, and Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 689–90. 
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criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing). It reflects what civil 
rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized the “pathology of 
oppression.”62 
Sanist myths exert especially great power over lawyers who 
represent persons with mental disabilities.63 The use of stereotypes, 
typification, and deindividualization inevitably means that sanist 
lawyers will trivialize both their clients’ problems and the importance 
of any eventual solution to these problems. Sanist lawyers implicitly 
and explicitly question their clients’ competence and credibility,64 a 
move that significantly impairs the lawyers’ advocacy efforts.65 
Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either 
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly 
in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making. In many 
cases, courts allow witnesses, especially expert witnesses, to 
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends. 
This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the 
judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans 
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, “blasé” judging, and at 
times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.66 All aspects of mental 
disability law are pervaded by sanism and by pretextuality, no matter 
whether the specific presenting topic is involuntary civil commitment 
law, right to refuse treatment law, the sexual rights of persons with 
mental disabilities, or any aspect of the criminal trial process.67   
Both sanism and pretextuality are further contaminated by our 
reliance on non-reflective “ordinary common sense” (OCS). OCS is a 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments, supra note 60, at 107 (quoting Kennedy); see also 
id. at 106 (“It should be clearly understood that sanists are bigots.”). For a subsequent consideration in 
this context, see Bruce G. Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for Persons with Mental Illness: 
Evidence from the Social Sciences, in STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS 87 (Paul Fink & Allan Tasman 
eds. 1992). 
 63. See Perlin, supra note 1; Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4; PERLIN, supra note 3. 
 64. See generally PERLIN, supra note 3; Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 684. 
 65. See Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000).  
 66. Michael L. Perlin,”She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and 
the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003–2004).  
 67. Id. 
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“powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making.”68 It is 
“prereflective” and is susceptible to precisely the type of 
idiosyncratic, reactive decision-making that has traditionally typified 
all mental disability legislation and litigation.69 It is supported by our 
reliance on a series of heuristics—cognitive-simplifying devices that 
distort our abilities to rationally consider information.70 
Our special education system is rife with sanism and pretextuality. 
It relies on shopworn myths, creates stigma, and demands 
reductionist deindividualization in textbook examples of sanism. 
Whether we are looking at the impact of special education labeling, 
the purported threat of disability classification “gaming,” the 
relationship between special education and the criminal justice 
system, or the relationship between special education and 
socioeconomic questions of race and class, the specter of 
pretextuality looms as a nearly unmovable presence. For the 
remainder of this paper, I will address each of these issues. 
IV.  RACE AND CLASS 
It is no surprise to learn that “[c]hildren of color are vastly over 
represented in both the juvenile justice and special education 
systems,”71 and that studies unanimously reveal that “race plays a 
powerful role in the placement of children in special education”72 and 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id.; see also Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the 
Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988) (OCS exemplified by the attitude of “What I 
know is ‘self evident’; it is ‘what everybody knows’”). 
 69. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and 
Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 29 (1990). 
 70. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 421–23 (2000); Perlin, 
supra note 66, at 26–27; PERLIN, supra note 3, at 4–16. The use of such heuristics “allows us to willfully 
blind ourselves to the ‘gray areas’ of human behavior.” Perlin, supra note 66, at 27. 
 71. Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: The 
Evolution of Children’s Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (1995) [hereinafter Glennon & Schwartz, 
Looking Back]; see generally, Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled 
Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237 [hereinafter Glennon, Race].  
 72. Matthew Ladner & Christopher Hammons, Special But Unequal: Race and Special Education, in 
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 107–08 (Chester E. Finn et al. eds., 2001) 
(quoted in Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting Behind 
No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of it All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 30 n.164 (2004)).  
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exerts a “disparate impact” on such placements.73 In 1992, by way of 
example, “blacks made up sixteen percent of public school students, 
but represented nearly forty percent of those in ‘special’ education 
classes”—classes for students with mental disabilities or other special 
needs.74 And there are confounding interstate rate differentials. “[I]n 
thirteen states, African-American students are at least three times 
more likely than white students to be identified as having mild mental 
retardation,” but “[i]n other states . . . African-American students are 
identified as having mild mental retardation at rates much closer to 
their presence in the student population.”75 To this end, we must also 
recall the description of some special education classes as being the 
end product of “classification plea bargaining.”76 Again, 
considerations of race cannot be avoided.77 
There are also gender issues to consider as well.  Professor 
Glennon points out: 
When the special education identification and placement figures 
are broken out by race and gender, a stark picture appears. Using 
white female students as the baseline, African American boys are 
the most overrepresented by very significant degrees in the 
categories of mental retardation and serious emotional 
disturbance. The race and gender disparities are striking: while 
African American females are 2.02 times as likely as white 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: 
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for 
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 422 (2001). 
 74. Sharon E. Rush, Identity Matters, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 909, 919 (2002). 
 75. Glennon, Race, supra note 71, at 1253 (relying upon OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., 1992 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE REPORT: PROJECTED 
VALUES (1992)). 
 76. Gartner & Lipsky, supra note 45, at 373. 
 77. On the subjectivity of some such judgments, see Regina Austin, Back to Basics: Returning to the 
Matter of Black Inferiority and White Supremacy in the Post-Brown Era, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79, 
85 (2004). “For example, education researchers considering the disproportionate placement of black 
students in special education have argued that labeling black students, particularly black males, retarded 
or emotionally disturbed is highly subjective and may be based on white female teachers’ 
misinterpretation of or lack of tolerance for the students’ verbal, behavioral, or cognitive styles.” Id. On 
gender issues, see infra text accompanying note 78. 
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females to be identified as mentally retarded, African American 
males are 3.26 times as likely.78 
Beyond this, Glennon notes that “studies and litigation demonstrate 
that African American males, once identified, are even more likely 
than other special education students to be placed in separate classes 
or separate schools which exert greater external controls over 
them.”79 Professor W. Ray Williams thus concludes that: 
The manner in which learning disabilities are defined and 
diagnosed implicates race, economic and class-based 
discrimination. When individuals, the benefactors of privilege 
and class, perform poorly, it is assumed to be due to some 
neurological or organic source. After all, as one commentator 
observed, these children “are by cultural definition intelligent 
and enjoy a presumption of intelligence because of their station 
in society.” Similarly, poor children are by cultural definition 
assumed dull, slow learners because of their place in the societal 
hierarchy.80 
It should be clear by now that we cannot consider learning 
disability and labeling questions in a hermetic vacuum. Decision-
making about learning disabilities inevitably implicates questions 
about race, gender, and social status, and interacts with decision-
making in the criminal justice system.81 Perhaps most important of 
all, the decision to label a child as “learning disabled”—although 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Theresa Glennon, Knocking Against the Rocks: Evaluating Institutional Practices and the 
African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 10, 20 (2002) [hereinafter Glennon, Knocking] 
(citing Donald P. Oswald et al., Community and School Predictors of Over Representation of Minority 
Children in Special Education, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE CONFERENCE ON MINORITY ISSUES 
IN SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 19,  
http://www.dimenet.com/dpolicy/archive.php?mode=P&id=523(last visited, Feb. 12, 2009)).  
 79. Glennon, Knocking, supra note 78, at 20 (citing Glennon, Race, supra note 71, at 1255). 
 80. Williams, supra note 54, at 631 (quoting in part, Brian Mikulak, Classism and Equal 
Opportunity: A Proposal for Affirmative Action in Education Based on Social Class, 33 HOW. L.J. 113, 
118 (1990–1991)). 
 81. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98.  
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often the only way to make it even remotely likely that the child will 
get educational services that provide him/her with “an appropriate 
education”82—may have a negative, irreversible, and life-long impact 
on the way the child thinks about herself (and her subsequent 
behavior) both as a child and an adult in the full range of social 
contexts.83 We cannot ignore this in our consideration of these issues. 
V.  THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
There is no question that children with learning disabilities are 
disproportionately over represented in the criminal justice system84 
and remain at high risk in that system85 for a variety of reasons, 
including judicial confusion between behavior and disabilities. 
Studies suggest that at least 40-50% of all jail and prison inmates 
have been classified as learning disabled;86 if undetected learning 
disabilities are included, some estimates rise to 80%.87 Learning 
                                                                                                                 
 82. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16). 
 83. My colleague Mark Weber notes: “Or it may be liberating. The student no longer blames himself 
or is considered ‘stupid’ or ‘lazy’, and may—one hopes—learn some tricks to survive in the educational 
system and beyond.” Personal communication with Mark Weber, St. Vincent DePaul Professor of Law, 
DePaul University College of Law (April 28, 2007). 
 84. See generally Deborah Shelton, A Study of Young Offenders With Learning Disabilities, 12 J. 
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 36, 40 (2006) (explaining that 38% of youth met diagnostic criteria for 
learning disability; 22% had co-existing psychiatric disorder; of this category, more than one-third were 
diagnosed with multiple psychiatric disorders); see also William S. Koski, Foreword: The Political 
Construction of Youth Crime and Its Policy Consequences, 14.1 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 5, 6 (2003); 
Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommodating Learning Disabilities Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1560, 1573 n.90 (1998) (citing Stanley J. Antonoff, We Can Make a 
Difference, in THE CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, DYSLEXIA AND OTHER LEARNING DISABILITIES 
I, 2–3 (Stanley J. Antonoff ed. 1993)). 
 85. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The “Child” Grows Up: The Juvenile Justice System Enters Its Second 
Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 589, 604 (1999). 
 86. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 
S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 442 (1993); Philip J. Kinsler et al, The Vermont Defendant Accommodation Project, 
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 134, 159 (2004). On the question of concerns about the validity of such 
classifications, see Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops? Learning-
Disabled Student-Athletes and the NCAA Initial Academic Eligibility Requirements, 66 TENN. L. REV. 
1049, 1104-05 (1999). 
 87. Jane Babin, Adequate Special Education: Do California Schools Meet the Test?, 37 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 211, 286 n. 473 (2000) (citing Clyde A. Winters, Learning Disabilities, Crime Delinquency, and 
Special Education Placement, 32 ADOLESCENCE 451, 451–60 (1997)). See also, Larkin McReynolds & 
Gail Wasserman,  Risk for Disciplinary Infractions Among Incarcerated Male Youths: Influence of 
Psychiatric Disorder, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1174, 1175 (2008), citing Gail Wasserman et al,  The 
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disabled children are an astonishing “220% more likely to be 
adjudicated delinquents than non-disabled youths.”88 Scholars have 
speculated that at least one reason for this link may be the disability 
itself:  
Compounding this problem is the reality that characteristics 
common to children with learning disabilities such as difficulty 
in listening, thinking, and speaking often lead to 
misinterpretation of a child’s behavior. As a result, a disabled 
minor’s poor presentation in court or during interrogation may be 
interpreted as dangerous, resulting in detention.89 
Much of this has been well documented for years, but there is now 
a new nuance which has received sparse attention90—the potential 
relationship between a learning disability label and an individual 
being subject to capital punishment. In the 2002 case of Atkins v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of people with 
mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
                                                                                                                 
Voice DISC-IV with Incarcerated Male Youth: Prevalence of Disorder, 41 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 314 (2002) (among incarcerated juveniles, the rate of mental illness rises to 
as high as 65%).   
 88. Id. (quoting Francis T. Murphy, Learning Disabilities and the Courts: Taking a Stand Against 
Indifference, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at S1 (Justice Murphy, at the time, was the Presiding Judge of the 
NY Appellate Division)). 
 89. Kathleen Kelly, The Education Crisis for Children in the California Juvenile Court System, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 760 (1999–2000); see also Peter E. Leone et al., Understanding the 
Overrepresentation of Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. REV. 389, 391–92 
(1995). On the way that public fears about the purported link between mental illness and dangerousness 
“drive the formal laws and policies governing mental disability jurisprudence,” see John Monahan, 
Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992), as discussed in Perlin, 
Lepers and Crooks, supra note 4, at 688 n.19. 
 90. But see Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 41 (2004) (reversing death penalty conviction in case in 
which defense counsel had presented mitigating evidence that Smith had learning disabilities and an IQ 
of seventy-eight which resulted in him being placed in special education classes). See also Holly 
Geerdes & Nikki Cox, Death Penalty Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 479, 504 (2006) (discussing Smith v. 
Texas in this context); Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist Narratives to 
Deconstruct The Myth of the Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 598 (2000–
2001) (discussing capital sentencing and stating, “Other conditions that can lead to marginalization and 
may best be explored through counter-narrative are mental difficulties and learning disabilities.”). 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/6
2009] DISABILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS  
 
 
627
 
against cruel and unusual punishment.91 The opening paragraph of 
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion speaks to the question at hand: 
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law’s 
requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and 
punished when they commit crimes. Because of their disabilities 
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, 
however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that 
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, 
their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of 
capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.92 
In coming to its conclusion, the Court drew on evidence 
persuading it that:  
Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not 
affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision of other 
potential murderers . . . . Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded 
offenders . . . . Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral 
impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable—
for example, the diminished ability to understand and process 
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely 
that they can process the information of the possibility of 
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct 
based upon that information.93  
                                                                                                                 
 91. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). I discuss Atkins in detail in Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, 
Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Mirrors], in 
Michael L. Perlin, Recent Criminal Legal Decisions: Implications for Forensic Mental Health Experts, 
in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING TOPICS AND EXPANDING ROLES 333  (Alan Goldstein ed., 2006), 
and MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCULO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
(2008 Cum. Supp.), § 12-4.2b, at 124–36. 
 92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. 
 93. Id. at 320 (citing, in part, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
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Clearly, many persons with learning disabilities will fit into the 
Court’s language in Atkins.94 
Five years ago, I presented a paper on Atkins at the annual meeting 
of the American College of Forensic Psychology in San Francisco, 
California.95 After my presentation concluded, an audience member 
(a forensic psychologist) approached me in the hall and told me this 
story.96 He had been asked to consult with defense counsel on a death 
penalty case in which the defendant’s IQ was clearly within the 
mental retardation range, but in which the defendant had never been 
classified as retarded or in need of special education. Puzzled, the 
psychologist investigated and contacted the school system that the 
defendant had attended. He was told that the decision to not so 
classify the person in question was a deliberate one, in spite of the 
fact that there was no question that he was, in fact, retarded.  
The reasoning went like this: the individual was African-American 
from an economically impoverished background and a shattered 
nuclear family. It was likely that he was going to have so many 
hurdles to face as he grew up, that, by avoiding the “mentally 
retarded” label (and keeping him out of special education classes), 
the school district was “doing him a favor” by placing one less 
obstacle in his way.97 Now, given the Court’s finding in Atkins that 
mental retardation involves “not only sub-average intellectual 
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as 
communication, self-care, and self-direction that bec[o]me manifest 
                                                                                                                 
 94. The Court defined mental retardation as involving “not only subaverage intellectual functioning, 
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction 
that became manifest before age 18.” Id. at 318. 
 95. Michael L. Perlin, Atkins for Experts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presented in 
April 2004). 
 96. I have no independent verification of the story, but I cannot fathom why he would tell me this if 
it were not true. 
 97.  Rebekah Gleason, Charter Schools and Special Education: Part of the Solution or Part of the 
Problem?, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 145, 164 (2007) (discussing schools surveyed in a Department of 
Education study used that “did not believe in labeling students as needing special education”); Moira 
O’Neill, Delinquent or Disabled? Harmonizing the IDEA Definition of “Emotional Disturbance” with 
the Educational Needs of Incarcerated Youth,57 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1207 (2006) (“[S]chools often use 
. . . exclusionary language to avoid labeling students as emotionally disturbed, preventing intervention 
and appropriate services while the youth is still in school.”).  
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before age 18,”98 the fact that there is no record of the defendant 
manifesting these characteristics before that age may ultimately lead 
to his death. 
I raise this here because it suggests to me how confounding any 
inquiry into all of the potential outcomes of a labeling decision, (or 
non-decision,) may be. No decisions in American courts are truly 
politics-free. The school district officials who declined to categorize 
the person to whom I just referred to as “mentally retarded” thought 
they were doing him a favor, and presumably were acting with 
munificent intentions. And they overtly premised their decision on 
political grounds. Yet, the implications of this decision could be the 
most profound of any decision-maker in American society—even 
though motivated by altruism, it could cost the individual his life.99 
VI.  LABELING AND GAMING 
Over the years, scholars devoted much attention to what is 
commonly referred to as “labeling theory.” They concluded that, 
when individuals are labeled as social deviants, labeling can often 
lead to social ostracism, social fragmentation, and social conflict.100 
The “very pattern of identification has consequences for the labeled 
person that are difficult to escape and contribute to recurring patterns 
of exclusion and deviant behavior.”101 Or, to put it simply, “the label 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). 
 99. This conundrum may be one to inspire further inquiry from the perspective of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and its relationship to the criminal law. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 743 
(2005);  DAVID B. WEXLER, REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (2008); David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Criminal Law, Research, and Practice, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 95 
(2005); Astrid Birgden & Tony Ward, Pragmatic Psychology Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Lens, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 334 (2003). 
 100. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 n.63 (2003) (citing Douglas 
Raybeck, Anthropology and Labeling Theory: A Constructive Critique, 16 ETHOS 371, 376 (Dec. 
1988)). 
 101. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal 
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 169 (1987). 
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of one as a deviant furthers one’s self-identification as a deviant.”102 
As Professor Martha Minow has noted, “The effect of others’ views, 
when those views assign the label of deviance, may well cause the 
individual to internalize that label, and feel degraded.”103 “The 
labeling theory approach emphasizes the community’s responsibility 
in assigning that label and attributing particular meanings of 
exclusion to it.”104 On the specific question of labeling and mental 
disability, she added: 
As used in the past by advocates for reform of the treatment of 
the mentally disabled, labeling theory focused attention on the 
majority that both assigned the label of mental incompetence and 
created the label’s exclusionary effect. The approach contended 
that some of the characteristics used to support the label were 
either figments of the majority’s imaginations, or responses of 
the labeled person to the effect of the label. These advocates did 
not assert that mental disability is itself fictional, but instead 
challenged particular consequences of the label’s application.105 
According to Matt Cohen, a special education attorney: 
The label becomes a scarlet letter branded on the person’s 
identity, shaping people’s assumptions and provoking their 
prejudices. The labels shape people’s assumptions about a 
person’s intellectual ability, about their personality, about their 
aspirations. In the school environment, the child’s label may 
have a significant impact on the teachers’ expectations for that 
child. Similarly, a particular label may have a profound impact 
on a parent’s perception of their child.106  
                                                                                                                 
 102. Darryl Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1358 (2001). 
 103. Minow, supra note 101, at 170 (citing EDWIN PFUHL, THE DEVIANCE PROCESS 213 (1980)). 
 104. Id. at 171. 
 105. Id. at 170–71. 
 106. http://www.ldonline.org/legal/cohen_paper_label.html (last visited, May 25, 2004).  
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As Jan Hunt, an education specialist has put it, “‘Labeling is 
disabling’ because children believe what we tell them.”107 
On the specific question of the relationship between labeling and 
learning disabilities, Professor Bruce Winick is explicit:  
Labeling the student as learning disabled may further this 
tendency, but an individual who truly has a learning disability 
may learn strategies and techniques to mitigate or overcome this 
disability. If the student is labeled as incompetent at reading or 
arithmetic, however, he or she may never again attempt these 
activities with the degree of commitment and energy required to 
master them.108 
Other studies demonstrate that students who are deemed eligible to 
receive special education services are “unnecessarily isolated, 
stigmatized, and confronted with fear and prejudice.”109 
Because of these potentially serious consequences, the IDEA 
requires school administrators to make independent decisions as to 
whether or not to conduct an evaluation to determine whether a child 
is disabled for purposes of the IDEA. Parental consent must be 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Jan Hunt, “Learning Disability”: A Rose by Another Name, 
http://www.naturalchild.com/jan_hunt/learning.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
 108. Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications for Mental 
Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 6, 19 (1995). For further discussion, see Cleveland v. Policy 
Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, The Interaction of the ADA, 
the FMLA, and Workers’ Compensation: Why Can’t We be Friends?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 821 (2002–
2003) (Although an individual can benefit from the ADA, social security and workers’ compensation 
concurrently, the differences in qualifications to gain the benefit and the subsequent benefits can create 
adverse consequences.).  
 109. Losen & Welner, supra note 73, at 407. See also Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting 
Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1082 
(2004–2005) (discussing House of Representatives Committee Report, H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 84, 98 
(2003), that concluded that “the mislabeling of minority students has `significant adverse consequences’ 
because of the stigma attached to labeling a child with a disability, the decreased self-perception of the 
labeled child, and the reduced curriculum that eligible children often receive”). On the “inevitability” of 
stigma in a race-based context, see Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 725. 
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obtained as a predicate to such actions.110 Further, as Professor 
Glennon has explained: 
Evaluations must meet numerous criteria designed to protect 
against mistaken identifications. For example, evaluation data 
must be collected by individuals with relevant training, and tests 
and other evaluation materials must be tailored to assess specific 
areas of educational need, such as reading and communication 
skills. These statutory protections extend to the interpretation of 
the data. A group of knowledgeable persons must consider 
evaluation data in light of a variety of factors, including the 
student’s social or cultural background, physical condition, and 
any adaptive behavior. A child may be placed in special 
education only if the team determines that (1) the child has one 
or more of the listed disabilities; (2) the disability interferes with 
educational performance; and (3) due to the disability, the child 
needs special education.111 
But there is another important side to all of this, and it is one that 
requires serious attention. The OCS112 “take” on special education 
and learning disabilities is radically different. To much of the public, 
this labeling is a game, a game controlled by the wealthy and the 
ambitious who, by manipulation and with the aid of conspiring 
educational evaluators, are able to have their children labeled as 
“LD” so as to “buy” them more time on tests (especially standardized 
college board-type tests) to increase the likelihood that they will get 
into more prestigious universities, and that, once at such universities, 
will be given more time on exams and on standardized tests needed 
for graduate schools (such as the law boards), thus improperly 
enhancing their grade point averages and their chances of admission 
                                                                                                                 
 110. 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b) (1994). However, if a parent refuses consent, the school district can 
initiate an administrative hearing process to seek an order requiring an evaluation. Id. 
 111. Glennon, Race, supra note 68, at 1248 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.532 (1994), 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1412(5)(C), 1414(a)(5) (1994)); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533 (1994), and 34 C.F.R. § 533(b) (1994)). 
 112. See Sherwin, supra note 68, at 737; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 69, at 29; Perlin, A Law 
of Healing, supra note 70, at 421–23. 
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to a more prestigious law school or other graduate program.113 Beth 
Robinson, who administers student-disability issues for the College 
Board, has been quoted as saying, “And it doesn’t matter what test 
you’re taking.  If people can find a way to give their kid an 
advantage, that family will do it, whether it’s the SAT or something 
else.”114 Again, there are social and racial politics at play here.115 At 
least one important critic has charged that the expansion of the 
“learning disability” category serves as a means of creating “a 
protective category for . . . white students or as a more ‘acceptable’ 
than labels of mental retardation or emotional disturbance for 
students of color experiencing school difficulties”116 in a way that 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 86, at 1059 (discussing critique charging that disabilities law give 
some a “competitive advantage”); id. at 1059 n.44 (conveying the allegations by some that “a little 
learning disability can be an advantageous thing”). Due to differences in definitions between the ADA 
and IDEA, students with a disability who did not receive services in primary and secondary school have 
a greater chance of receiving services during higher education. Under the ADA, an individual is eligible 
if he or she either has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities, a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2) (2006). In contrast to the ADA, which uses broad terms to define impairment, the IDEA 
specifically lists the impairments that are considered disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006).  
On the significant differences (for funding purposes) between the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, see Garda, supra note 41, at 447 (“Because states receive no federal monies for children 
eligible solely under [§] 504, there is arguably a strong incentive to over-identify children as IDEA 
eligible.”). 
 114. Michael Scott Moore, Buying Time, available at http://archive.salon.com/books/it/2000/02/09/ 
test/print.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). There is no valid and reliable empirical evidence that the 
perception that “gaming the system” actually “buys” an advantage for a test-taker without a disability, 
but in this area, as in so many other areas of law, society and policy, the “vividness heuristic” 
overwhelms the evidentiary database. See Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 69. On the pernicious role 
of related perceptions in all of law school admissions, see Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, 
Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT: Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and a Redefinition of 
Merit, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 41, 93–94 (2006).  
 115. In Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the 
IDEA did not categorically bar reimbursement of private-education tuition if a child had not previously 
received special education and related services through the public school, and that it authorized 
reimbursement of the costs of child’s private special-education services. On the multiple issues raised by 
questions involving the interplay of special education and reimbursement for private education, see 
Mark C. Weber, Services for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural Regularity, 36 J.L. 
& EDUC. 163 (2007). 
 116. Christine E. Sleeter, Radical Structuralist Perspectives on the Creation and Use of Learning 
Disabilities, in DISABILITY & DEMOCRACY 153, 161–62 (Thomas M. Skrtic ed. 1995). 
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allows white middle-class parents to obtain special benefits for their 
children.117 
For a period of time, the Educational Testing Service (ETS) 
“flagged” test scores of students who received extra time on 
exams.118 A panel of experts, however, found that this practice 
“appear[ed] to single out and treat the group with learning disabilities 
unequally, [and] diminish[ed] fair chances for college admission.”119 
ETS eventually settled litigation, and agreed to stop flagging 
exams.120 
There is little question that the number of students in higher 
education reporting learning disabilities, as a percentage of those 
reporting any disability, continues to grow geometrically. In 1988, 
16.1% of students with disabilities reported a learning disability. In 
2001, the percentage more than doubled, rising to 40.1%, while at the 
same time the number of students reporting other disabilities 
declined.121 To many, this takes the form of evidence that “some 
parents purposely take advantage of a learning disability label to give 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Christine E. Sleeter, Learning Disabilities: The Social Construction of a Special Education 
Category, 53 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 46, 47–48 (1986). 
 118. On ETS’s practice of “flagging,” see, for example, Nancy Leong, Beyond Breimhorst: 
Appropriate Accomodation of Students with Learning Disabilities on the SAT, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2135, 
2136–37 (2005). Compare Wong v. Regents of Univ. of California, 410 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Medical school applicant’s “reading comprehension scores, when allowed to read without time limits, 
were at the 99.5 percentile, but under time constraints,” were at the eighth grade level.). 
 119. Noel Gregg et al., The Flagging Test Scores of Individuals with Disabilities Who Are Granted 
the Accommodation of Extended Time: A Report of the Majority Opinion of the Blue Ribbon Panel on 
Flagging, available at http://www.dralegal.org/downloads/cases/breimhorst/majority_report.txt (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2009). See generally Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Fable of the Timed and Flagged LSAT: 
Do Law School Admissions Committees Want the Tortoise or the Hare? 38 CUMB. L. REV. 33 (2008-
09). 
 120. The flagging case—Breimhorst v. Educational  Testing Service, No. C-99-3387, 2000 WL 
34510621 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000)—is discussed extensively (and criticized) in Michael Edward 
Slipsky, Flagging Accommodated Testing on the LSAT and MCAT: Necessary Protections of the 
Academic Standards of the Legal and Medical Communities, 82 N.C. L. REV. 811 (2003-2004). 
 121. Suzanne Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education: A Practical Guide 
to ADA Requirements, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 217, 217–18 (2003) (citing AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., COLLEGE 
FRESHMEN WITH DISABILITIES: A BIENNIAL STATISTICAL PROFILE 7 tbl.2 (2001). The author speculates 
that among the possible reasons for the increase in students reporting learning disabilities was “the 
relatively recent discovery of handicapping earning disabilities, such as dyslexia, dyscalculia, 
dysgraphia, dyspraxia, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD).” Id. at 218. As she notes further, “Learning disorders have always existed; they simply were 
not recognized as disabilities requiring accommodations.” Id. 
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their fast-track children a hand-up.”122 Other authors are more 
malignant,123 referring to invokers of disability laws as 
“opportunists,”124 or as “malingerers,”125 or “shameless shirkers,”126 
and criticizing such laws as providing a “lifelong buffet of perks 
[and] special breaks.”127 Others claim that “many students, possibly 
goaded by their disappointed parents, simply fake their impairment in 
order to get a free ride.”128 One critic in the popular press has 
characterized learning disabilities as an “opportunistic tautology.”129 
The reality, of course, is quite different. In the most important legal 
challenge to a policy by which Boston University (BU) made 
accommodations to students with learning disabilities: 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Williams, supra note 54, at 662 n.226 (citing Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16). 
 123. So are some judges. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 354 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(charging, with no supporting evidence, that “nothing has changed” in over 300 years since Lord Hale 
discussed “the easiness of counterfeiting [mental] disability”). Compare Perlin, Mirrors, supra note 91, 
at 344 (characterizing this aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion as a “pathetic recapitulation of [the] dreary 
myth” reflected in the “fear of faking” by criminal defendants alleging mental disability). Valid and 
reliable instruments that expose feigned malingering have been available to researchers for years, and 
have been written about extensively in articles in databases that are readily available to Supreme Court 
justices. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Explanatory Models of Malingering, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
543 (1994); Richard Rogers et al., Feigning Neuropsychological Impairment: A Critical Review of 
Methodological and Clinical Considerations, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOG. REV. 255 (1993) (cited in 
William Wilkinson, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Workers’ Compensation, 30 ARIZ. ATT’Y 28, 29 
n.12 (April 1994)); Shayna Gothard et al., Detection of Malingering in Competency to Stand Trial 
Evaluations, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493 (1995) (cited in, inter alia, David R. Katner, Raising Mental 
Health Issues—Other than Insanity—in Juvenile Delinquency Defense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 90 n.101 
(2000)). 
 124. Jessica Barth, Disability Benefits and the ADA after Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems, 
75 IND. L.J. 1317, 1320 (2000) (citing John Leo, Let’s Lower the Bar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 
5, 1998, at 19). 
 125. See Ann Hubbard, A Military-Civilian Coalition for Disability Rights, 75 MISS. L.J. 975, 1000–
01 (2005–2006); see also supra note 123. 
 126. Michelle Stevens, High Court Must Define Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 2, 1999, at 35. 
 127. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
239, 240 (2001) (quoting Shalit, supra note 122, at 16). 
 128. Samuel S. Heywood, Without Lowering the Bar: Eligibility for Reasonable Accommodations on 
the Bar Exam for Learning Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 GA. L. 
REV. 603, 633 (1998-1999) (quoting critics). 
 129. Susan M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning-Disabled 
Students and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 
AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 163 n.84 (2003) (quoting Shalit, supra note 122, at 16, 21). 
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The court found that, not only were the university’s initial 
policies toward students with learning disabilities based on 
uninformed stereotypes, myths, and misconceptions, there was 
not a single documented instance at BU in which a student with a 
learning disability had fabricated a disorder to claim eligibility 
for academic accommodations.130  
In fact, the empirical research reveals this pattern: 
Further, when given extra time, students with learning 
disabilities score at comparable levels to students without 
disabilities. But these studies also find that students without 
disabilities do not improve their scores significantly when given 
extra time. In contrast, students with learning disabilities who are 
given extra time, although improving substantially from the 
regularly-timed exam condition, still score lower than students 
without disabilities given no extra time.131  
Yet, the position of disparagement is still the one consonant with 
the public’s OCS, and has served to malignantly contaminate the 
debate and discourse over special education law. If the common 
wisdom is right—which it definitely is not—then that would call into 
question all of the theory and policy that led to the creation of special 
education law. It would suggest that all special education law is a 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Peter David Blanck, Civil Rights, Learning Disability, and Academic Standards, 2 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 33, 49 (1998) (emphasis added) (discussing the decision in Guckenberger v. Boston 
Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997), which held that Boston University discriminated against 
students with learning disabilities by establishing unreasonable eligibility criteria for qualifying as a 
student with a learning disability; by not providing reasonable procedures for evaluating their requests 
for academic accommodations; and by instituting a blanket policy precluding course substitutions in 
foreign language and mathematics as academic accommodations). Cf. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of 
California, 410 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 131. Blanck, supra note 130, at 49–50 (citing Elaine H. Alster, The Effects of Extended Time on 
Algebra Test Scores for College Students with and Without Learning Disabilities, 30 J. LEARNING 
DISABILITIES 222, 225 (1997), and M. Kay Runyan, The Effect of Extra Time on Reading 
Comprehension Scores for University Students With and Without Learning Disabilities, 24 J. LEARNING 
DISABILITIES 104, 108 (1991)) (emphasis added).  
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pretext, and that, with regard to this population, at least, the remedial 
and prophylactic aspects of IDEA are no more than a sham. 
But when this position is examined critically, it reveals the same 
sort of sanism that pervades all aspects of mental disability law. 
Among the most common sanist myths132 are the myths that (1) 
persons with mental disabilities are “faking”133 and (2) such persons 
would not be mentally disabled if they only “tried harder.”134 The 
“gaming take” on special education and learning disabilities plays 
directly into these sanist myths in extremely troubling ways. In fact, 
this entire controversy appears to be a textbook reflection of the 
pernicious impact of the vividness heuristic.135 One vivid, negative 
anecdote—perhaps even an apocryphal one with no basis in fact—
overwhelms an extensive contrary statistical database.136 
CONCLUSION 
We cannot meaningfully and coherently think seriously about the 
special education/learning disability system without thinking about 
stigma, and we cannot think seriously about stigma without 
acknowledging its potential disparate impacts. I stated earlier that the 
learning disability descriptor was a multi-edged sword;137 I have the 
inchoate suspicion that there are even more dimensions to this puzzle 
than I have been able to articulate here. But I believe that any 
analysis of the question at hand must begin with an acknowledgment 
of the complexity of the underlying social issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See generally Perlin, supra note 1, at 393–97. 
 133. See Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity Defense, 
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375 
(1996–1997). 
 134. See Perlin, supra note 66, at 8. 
 135. See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the 
Last Frontier?,  20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 536–37 (1993–1994). On the failures of the 
vividness heuristic as a cognitive device, see Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in 
Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 74–75 (2006–2007). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 112–14. 
 137. See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 51 (2006) (discussing how changes in IDEA law “are, at best, 
double-edged”). 
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Recall my discussions of sanism and pretextuality. Disability law 
policy reflects sanism and pretextuality at every important juncture. 
And this is no less so in matters of learning disabilities and special 
education law. Labeled children are—via sanism—typified, slotted, 
and stereotyped.138 Pretextuality—reflected in decision-making that 
is infected by racial, class, and gender biases—dominates the entire 
system. Society’s OCS—self-referential and non-reflective—lazily 
relies on the vividness heuristic (by way of stories that appear to be 
no more than “urban myths”) to shape the public’s views on difficult 
and complicated issues. And we are left with a system that is, in 
many important ways, stunningly incoherent.139 
Earlier, I identified several pitfalls that must be considered if we 
are to understand the underlying issues: problems of funding, 
problems with the ways that mainstreaming is operationally done, 
and problems with the creation of new stereotypes.140 Thinking about 
these again, we are once more confronted with the impact of sanism 
and pretextuality on each one of these “pitfalls.”141 
Recall finally my reference to a Bob Dylan line in the title of this 
paper today: “Simplify you, classify you.” This is precisely what we 
do through our special education/learning disability system. We 
simplify complicated issues and categorize children’s lives through 
rigid classification schemes. And, in doing so, to continue with the 
couplet in question, we also “deny [you]” and “defy [you].”142 We 
deny the complexity of the issues, and we defy those—such as 
                                                                                                                 
 138. On “slotting” in a related context, see Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and 
Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 125 (1991) (The use of the typification heuristic by 
which treating doctors slot “patients into certain categories, and prescribes a similar regimen for all.”).  
 139. See Perlin, supra note 3, at 3–5, 28–36 (concluding that mental disability law “is irrational and 
incoherent, and this irrationality and incoherence disables civil commitment law, institutional treatment 
law, civil rights law, and criminal procedure law”). 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
 141. Compare Weber, supra note 137, at 51 (“It is the vision of special education as something not all 
that special which should be driving reform. The vision should be that of children with disabilities 
whose progress is indistinguishable from that of their peers, due to intense and effective services and 
accommodations not restricted by the hours of the ordinary school day or the strictures of traditional 
educational programming. It is the vision of those children doing so, while mixed in with other children, 
without any stigma imposed on those who learn in different ways or with additional support.”). 
 142. DYLAN, supra note 8. 
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Professors Glennon or Blanck or Weber—who seek to explicate these 
issues and to redefine them in socially progressive ways. All I really 
want to do—as Dylan might have said—is to shed some new light on 
the issue at hand. Perhaps then, we will take one step on the journey 
of making meaningful education for all children with disabilities a 
true and authentic reality. 
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